Football Frenzy – Wall Street on the 2026 FIFA World Cup

The 2026 FIFA World Cup was one for the ages, with records set all over the pitch and stands, from goals scored to attendance levels. However, before a ball was even kicked at the tournament, Wall Street had already attempted to predict the impact of the World Cup away from the stadium, upon the American economy. To focus on two firms in particular, Goldman Sachs forecast a modest, short-lived boost whereas Bank of America predicted a considerably bigger impact. So, approximately two months after the tournament’s conclusion, what story does the real data tell?

Ahead of kick-off, FIFA and the World Trade Organisation’s combined study surpassed all of Wall Street’s estimations, projecting the US and the world to see a $17.2 billion and a $40.9 billion rise in GDP respectively as a direct result of the tournament, in addition to the creation of 185,000 new full-time positions in the States. Bank of America broadly echoed this optimism, forecasting a $41 billion global GDP boost and predicting a 30-40,000 payroll increase in leisure and hospitality roles across the US in May and June. Contrastingly, Goldman Sachs’ economists Kevin Daly and Mambuna Njie analysed GDP data covering every World Cup since 1982 and found hosting procedures to only be marginally positive, with a statistically insignificant effect on real output. Goldman did still expect a short-term rise in hiring equating to approximately 40,000 additional jobs in June and 10,000 in July before around 15,000 layoffs in August as temporary roles were to conclude. Thus, an evident disagreement on the long-term effects of the World Cup was in play.

FIFA’s $17.2 billion estimation was a far cry from Goldman’s near-zero verdict. A major contributor to this was a difference in forecasting methodologies. FIFA’s model incorporated direct, indirect and induced effects, a standard practice for event impact studies though this assumes only new expenditure to occur rather than accounting for substitution. In simpler terms, this forecast hinged on a multiplier effect arising from visitors and workers inside the US. Goldman’s method rested on a simpler observation whereby the ‘new money’ generated in FIFA’s multiplier effect would have either already been spent on alternatives in the US, or that a significant proportion of expenditure occurs outside of the US entirely, negating the impact on the US’ GDP. Moreover, Goldman compounded this view by highlighting that the host nations (the US, Canda and Mexico) together represent around 30% of global GDP, meaning that $17.2 billion represents less than 0.1% of the joint GDP, an infinitesimal amount in the long-run.

This brings us to the real data. Actual figures landed a lot closer to Goldman’s predictions, albeit for a reason that nobody quite forecast. US job reports for June showed leisure and hospitality roles to have actually plummeted by around 61,000, a stark contrast to both Goldman and Bank of America’s estimations. The reason for this was that businesses had adapted to World Cup-driven demand via increased productive efficiency from existing workers, rather than the assumed mass hiring, with average weekly hours in the sector not even rising at the time.

Bank of America Institute’s own card-transaction data can be used to explain this. Evidence shows in-person expenditure to have risen by around 5% between June 10th and July 5th in US host cities as opposed to the same time period in 2025. Restaurants and bars in particular posted some of the strongest gains. Real economic activity did happen, it just didn’t require any new staff to deliver it, something that every bank’s model completely overlooked.

Ultimately, no single bank fully anticipated what eventually happened. Goldman Sachs’ scepticism proved closer to the mark than both FIFA and Bank of America’s optimism, though no forecast was particularly accurate. The 2026 FIFA World Cup has shown that, in a labour market with elevated hiring costs and no shortage of economic uncertainty, businesses had more than enough flexibility to absorb temporary demand spikes through existing employees rather than hiring new ones.